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Abstract
　Change in technology and in the policy environment 
can provide opportunities for firms to enter new 
markets by leveraging competencies in a new market 
place. This paper examines the apparent renaissance 
of Japanʼs aerospace industry. For decades, Japanese 
aerospace has failed to attain the international market 
share enjoyed by Japanese automobiles, machine 
tools, computer equipment or consumer electronics. 
Part of this failure relates to the industryʼs ties to the 
American aerospace sectors, which constrained the 
growth options for major firms. However, a new policy 
environment, motivated in part by Chinaʼs growth, as 
well as technological change, it opening up competitive 




　Japan remains the worldʼs second largest 
economy, and some of its firms enjoy strong 
competitive positions. However, the country has 
been afflicted by sluggish growth for the best part 
of twenty years and the rise of China and other 
emerging markets have underlined the vulnerability 
of Japanʼs highly-skilled industrial base as Japanese 
firms move production offshore. Though Japanese 
firms appear to create considerable amounts of 
intellectual property－as measured by patents, for 
example－the ability of firms to translate these 
ideas into viable products and services has been 
criticised. There is a widespread perception that 
Japan has ceded design and market leadership to 
foreign firms in areas such as consumer electronics, 
semiconductors and computer peripherals.
　The relative inability of Japanese firms to adapt to 
new technologies or seize new market opportunities 
has been extensively studied in the management 
literature and both firm-level and national-level 
explanations have been offered. For some, the 
primary problem lies inside Japanese firms, where 
organizational routines and culture inhibit adap-
tation. Japanese firms are said to embrace a culture 
of risk aversion and consensus that does not offer 
the firm the ability to change direction quickly. 
Collinson and Wilson（2006︶, for example, suggest 
that some Japanese firms are ʻill-equippedʼ to cope 
with changes in the international business world, 
reliant as they are on certain organisational routines. 
Other scholars point to problems with a conservative 
and over-dominant industrial policy bureaucracy. In 
her study of the computer software industry, 
Anchordoguy（2000）explains Japanʼs failure to 
develop a world beating software sector as an 
institutional failure. In this instance, the Japanese 
governmentʼs emphasis on manufacturing excel-
lence led important officials within MITI to 
disregard the importance of software. For some 
other authors, the crisis results from a system-level 
inability of the Japanese developmental state to 
compete with the more free-market oriented 
economies of the United States and Europe. 
Yamamura and Streeck（2003）refer to a ʻdeep and 
lasting performance crisisʼ afflicting Japan as the 
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Japanese model of nonliberal capitalism comes 
under pressure from neoliberal capitalist forces. 
Witt（2006）examines the extensive social net-
working among industry personnel and suggests 
that the incentives created by this system can 
reward risk aversion and strategic isomorphism. 
Okada（2006）offers a particularly stark assess-
ment: ʻMechanisms and institutions that brought 
Japan prosperity in the 1970s and 1980s have 
become dysfunctional and less usefulʼ.1
　This paper seeks to add to this debate about the 
innovation gap among Japanese firms via an analysis 
of an industrial sector where Japanese firms are 
aiming to innovate: aerospace. In doing so, the 
paper shows how the interaction of external events 
and the internal development of capabilities in a 
major Japanese firm interact to produce new 
capabilities. The evidence presented here suggests 
a more nuanced picture of Japanʼs industrial 
landscape. Incumbent firms are taking advantage of 
changes in the marketplace and doing so by 
leveraging internal capabilities.2 This paper 
suggests that the Japanese manufacturing model 
may not be a rigidly path-dependent as sometimes 
portrayed, but rather mixes continuity with 
important elements of flexibility and openness.3 
What is interesting about the aerospace industry is 
that it is undergoing considerable technological 
change, perhaps even a period of technological 
discontinuity. As such, the ability of an incumbent 
firm to innovate is noteworthy.4
　Japanʼs aerospace industry is small by comparison 
with other national aerospace sectors but there are 
indications that Japanese aerospace will see 
significant expansion in the coming years. Honda, 
for example, has developed a small jet designed for 
commuter work. Most significant, however has 
been the development of a new regional jet by 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries（MHI︶. Announced in 
2007, the jet is planned to compete against Embraer 
and Bombardier in the 100 seat jet aircraft market. 
This announcement was significant in several 
respects. First, it would mark the first attempt by 
Japan to develop a complete aircraft since the YS-11 
programme almost 30 years ago. For most of its 
existence, Japanʼs aerospace industry has been a 
subcontractor－mainly to US industry. Second, 
Mitsubishi made much of the advanced technology 
embodied in the aircraft; the fuselage would be 
primarily constructed of carbon fibre and the new 
engines would anticipate more stringent EU noise 
and pollution regulations due to come into force in 
2009. Finally, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry（METI）acknowledged that the Japanese 
state would meet 50 per cent of the development 
costs. METIʼs strong support of the programme 
was seen as a clear indication of a renewed interest 
by METI in pushing Japanese companies to the 
forefront of airliner technology.
　Japan is only one of several countries looking to 
develop an aerospace sector. China, Russia and 
even India have all launched serious efforts to enter 
the market traditionally dominated by European 
and American firms. The success of Canada 
and－more importantly－Brazil in the regional 
market has shown that medium-sized economies 
are able to support successful aerospace industries. 
More generally, the evolution of the sector toward 
greater modularisation and the adoption of new 
technologies in the face of environmental pressures 
may represent a point of ʻdiscontinuityʼ where 
incumbent firms face threats to their survival.5 
EADS Chairman, Louis Gallois, forecast a ʻruptureʼ 
in the design and manufacture of aircraft in the face 
of advances in process and product technologies.6
　The argument explored in this paper is whether a 
combination of technological change and rivalry 
with China are inducing profound change in Japanʼs 
sectoral innovation system for aerospace－and that 
one firm, Mitsubishi, has seized this opportunity. 
For most of the past five decades, aerospace 
production was concentrated in Europe and the 
United States, and this dominance was underpinned 
by production processes that militated against new 
entrants and the kind of dispersed production seen 
in other industries. However, as the industry moves 
to embrace new product and process technologies, 
opportunities open up for previously ʻsecond-tierʼ 
players such as Japan. In terms of technology, 
Japanʼs strength in both composite materials and 
production technologies has given its firms key 
roles in new Boeing programmes. This paper 
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explores whether Japan will build on this strong 
position to develop a fully-fledged aerospace 
sector.
　A related development concerns the emergence 
of China as a regional rival to Japan. For decades, it 
was simply not cost effective to produce civil aircraft 
in more than one location. In sharp contrast to other 
manufacturing industries, aerospace was almost 
bereft of foreign direct investment. Firms were 
international in the sense that they sold aircraft 
globally and used international supply networks; 
none of Airbus, Boeing, Bombardier or Embraer 
had a production facility outside their home 
nation（or region in Airbusʼ case︶. This is changing. 
Airbus is committed to building a narrow-body 
production facility in China, and both Bombardier 
and Embraer are developing deep cooperative 
efforts with Chinese producers. The industry may 
be on the brink of profound shifts in the business 
model, with equally profound implications for 
domestic firms and governments. For Japan, 
Chinaʼs emergence as a potential Asian rival for 
aerospace related work and investment would seem 
to have significant policy considerations. Japanese 
firms have carved out significant roles in civil 
programmes but their military capabilities remain 
modest. Given the flow of technology between civil 
and military aerospace, this may be prob-
lematic－particularly given Chinaʼs dramatic 
increase in military spending.
　
Ⅱ　Methodology
　Research that touches upon the political process 
can present problems for researchers. Firms are 
often unwilling to discuss their activities and access 
to policymakers can be difficult.7 Triangulation of 
data is important to mitigate these problems. 
Following Eisenhardtʼs work on case study research 
this paper draws on a variety of sources for data.8 
Published data in the specialist aerospace press, 
companies and trade associations offer a detailed 
timeline for the development of the MRJ project. 
The paper also makes extensive use of government 
documents relating to Japanese technology policy 
and aerospace; importantly, the paper utilises 
published minutes of the METI committee charged 
with developing and implementing policy for the 
MRJ project. Finally, several interviews were 
conducted, in English and Japanese, between 
October 2007 and June 2008 with aerospace industry 
personnel and serving and former METI officials. 
Most of these were conducted in Tokyo, but one 
was conducted in the United Kingdom. These 
interviews were semi-structured in design and 
detailed notes taken. Interviewees preferred not to 
be recorded and their names are not used in the 
text. Interviewees were selected in a non-
probabalistic manner appropriate to research where 
knowledge of the dynamics and detail of a case is 
important rather than organisational status, per se. 
　
Ⅲ　 From exceptional to normal: 
technological change in aerospace
　From its inception, aerospace was regarded as an 
economically exceptional case, justifying gov-
ernment intervention. Moreover, firms in the sector 
employed relatively specific assets and technologies 
in product development, which spawned particular 
forms of economic organization. This may be 
changing. The emerging model differs from the 
old in being more decentralised, with greater em-
phasis on collaboration, as well as technological 
underpinnings that have both shifted and become 
more varied. Product improvements in aerospace 
have generally been incremental, with gradual 
changes in design; the sector has not seen the 
dominant design challenged since the dawn of the 
jet age in the 1950s.9 Competition in the sector is 
thus marked by strategic isomorphism, with Boeing 
and Airbus offering remarkably similar products to 
customers.10 
　This incremental innovative process has been 
under pressure in recent years. In terms of 
production processes, aerospace has come to look 
much more like other manufacturing industries, 
with an emphasis on lean production techniques. 
Starting with the 767 and 777 programmes, Boeing 
has been increasingly willing to shift away from a 
hierarchical product development process to a 
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collaborative network, with much greater in-
volvement of suppliers as designers.
　An important change has been the increased use 
of composite materials in preference to metal. This 
trend is part of the second pressure facing aircraft 
makers; incremental technological innovation in 
aerospace is not delivering the increases in economy 
and environmental compliance that stakeholders 
are demanding.11 As demands on manufacturers 
have become more numerous and complex, so has 
the technical challenge of making the aircraft. The 
response has been to develop increasingly modular 
modes of production. The drive for weight 
reductions and environmental compliance has 
reinforced the specialisation of the supply networks. 
Key suppliers now take on considerable risk, not 
just for product but for research and development. 
More importantly, increasing technological spe-
cialisation tilts the power relationship between 
suppliers and the final assembler. Finally, the 
importation of lean production techniques and the 
more general trend toward modular production in 
the industry has benefited firms that have 
considerable exposure to non-aerospace activities. 
Mitsubishi is one such firm.
　
1　Evolution of Japanʼs aerospace industry 
　After 1945, Japanʼs aerospace industry was 
effectively placed under the control of the US, which 
for the first eight years after the end of the war, 
banned any Japanese manufacture of aircraft. Once 
the ban was lifted, the United States encouraged 
the development of some indigenous aerospace 
capability and the sectorʼs commercial and techno-
logical development fell under the aegis of the 
Ministry of International Trade and Indus-
try（MITI︶, which was reorganized in 2001 as the 
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry（METI︶. 
Aerospace and Defence Industries Division︵ADID︶
of Manufacturing Industries Bureau at METI has a 
responsibility to promote both the civil and defence 
aviation industries as well as the space industry. 
The legal foundation of the industry policy for the 
aviation industry is the Aircraft Industry Promotion 
Law of 1958（Kokuki Kogyo Shinko Ho, No. 150︶. 
Beginning in the 1960s, Japan attempted to develop 
a civil airliner programme designed to act as a 
technology driver in much the same way as other 
policies for other sectors, such as memory chips, 
flat panel displays or supercomputing（Fong, 1998︶. 
Though the resulting programme, the YS-11, was a 
commercial failure, it did little to temper MITIʼs 
eagerness to support the sector. Attention was 
shifted to the creation of co-production agreements 
with foreign－mainly American－partners. Though 
Japanese firms gradually increased their workshare 
on many American（mainly Boeing）civil aircraft 
programmes, there were suggestions that the 
relationship militated against Japanese firms from 
gaining the requisite expertise to develop the 
capacity to design, build and market their own 
aircraft.12
　For most of its history, the Japanese aerospace 
industry produced military aircraft. This is true to 
the current day, with some 61 per cent of the 
industryʼs turnover generated by military 
sales－effectively procurement by Japanʼs Self-
Defence Forces.13 Japanese aerospace firms, like 
their American counterparts, benefited greatly 
military procurement, both by providing revenues 
from procurement but also in allowing a degree of 
technological development. 
　The development of the F-2（FS-X）indigenous 
fighter is perhaps the best example of the use of a 
military programme as a platform for technological 
development. The F-2 programme was conceived in 
the 1980s as a way for Japan to lessen its dependence 
on the US for military equipment. The F-2 differs 
from other Japanese military programmes in not 
being a licensing agreement: Japanese firms have 
extensive responsibility for design, as well as 
production. The programme had been dogged by 
controversy for years－and the first fighters only 
became operational in 2004. The F-2 makes much 
greater use of composite materials in its con-
struction, as well as having more sophisticated 
computerised flight controls and an indigenously 
produced source code. A key technological advance 
is the composite wing－made by Mitsubishi－which 
dramatically reduces weight and aids ma-
noeuvrability. MHI used the F-2 programme as a 
test bed for its composite materials design and 
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production processes. The programme, ʻhas given 
MHI hands-on experience in working through 
difficult composite design and production problems 
that will serve it well as it undertakes the commercial 
assignment of producing composite wingboxes for 
the Boeing 787ʼ.14 The company, however, also 
benefited from military research and development 
funding investigating the use of composite materials 
for large scale, load-bearing aeronautical struc-
tures.
　Though military procurement and R&D support 
was important to Japanese aerospace, the limitations 
are also noteworthy. Japanʼs constitutional limits on 
defence spending never allowed the massive, 
military-led subsidies enjoyed by US firms during 
the Cold War. As noted earlier, unlike the US 
industry, Japan has few specialist aerospace firms; 
the key firms are all integrated manufacturers with 
interests in several industries. 
　
Ⅳ　The rising challenge from China
　On March 12, 2007 Xinhua news agency reported 
Chinaʼs plans to produce its own large commercial 
jet by 2020 and so challenge the dominance of 
Boeing and Airbus initially in the domestic Chinese 
market which is booming, and eventually globally. 
A more serious challenge, however, is presented by 
Chinaʼs emergence as an important subcontractor
－potentially in preference to Japan－for major 
western firms and the Chineseʼ clear plans for an 
indigenous regional jet. Rather like Japan decades 
earlier, China is utilising a mix of indigenous 
technological development and links with western 
firms such as Boeing to build capability and 
credibility.
　China has long had ambitions in aerospace. A 
fifty-seat turbo-prop engine regional aircraft was 
developed in the 1960ʼs.15 Efforts were stepped up 
in the 1980ʼs with the reverse engineering of the 
Boeing 707 to form the Y-10 and development of the 
Y-7, a turbo-prop regional aircraft. However both 
models were market failures with insufficient 
demand in both domestic and export markets. The 
Y-10 was fuel inefficient relative to the Boeing 707 
and the Y-7 faced safety failures. In 2000 the MA-
60（or Xinzhou 60 as it is known in China）was 
launched, a 56-60 turboprop with an extended 
fuselage, lighter frame and longer range. The 
emergence of high-speed rail links made the aircraft 
uneconomic.16 China is also developing the 95-100 
seater ARJ21 in conjunction with US suppliers such 
as GE and Honeywell. Whilst about 70 aircraft have 
been sold, this has been predominantly with 
domestic sales.17
　Chinese efforts have been hampered by poor 
supply chain management and a non-existent 
capability to market and support the aircraft in the 
international market. However there are signals on 
the horizon that things appear to be changing. By 
making greater use of collaborative agreements 
with western firms the Chinese buy both technology 
and market credibility. As important there are 
indications that the Chinese industry is developing 
significant research and development capabilities. 
An indicator of Chinaʼs emerging scientific strength 
in the area, ʻin 2004 39％ of Aerospace Engineering 
authors were from China although remarkably 
lower in the case of the Journal of Aerospace 
Engineeringʼ.18 So whilst perhaps not reaching 
world-class levels of either scientific（via 
publications）or technical（via patents）advance-
ment, China is taking cumulative, incremental steps 
both in general technological progress and the 
specific area of aerospace.
　As in Japan, military procurement offers Chinese 
firms a way to develop. China successfully makes 
transport planes and an array of sophisticated 
warplanes harking back to their close relationship 
with the former Soviet Union which enabled China 
to manufacture several thousand jet fighters and 
bombers within a large-scale military aircraft 
industry.19 Chengdu Aero-engine Company was 
the largest supplier of jet fighter engines and is a 
subcontractor of Pratt and Whitney and Rolls Royce, 
whilst Xiʼan Aero-engine Company was historically 
the location for Spey engines manufactured under 
license from Rolls Royce and in 1997 it entered a 
joint venture with Rolls Royce to produce turbine 
blades.20 China reached a milestone when the 
Chinese National Space agency successfully 
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completed its first manned space capsule in 2004 
and Chinaʼs maintenance, repairs and over-
haul（MRO）sector has been opened to foreign 
investment.
　
1　 Relationships with International Aerospace 
companies
　Overall, China has been a subcontractor for a vast 
array of parts: doors, wing section, turbine disks, 
blades, bores, rings, atmosphere instruments, 
meteorological radar, general radar instruments, 
pumps and valves. Earlier subcontract work for 
McDonnell-Douglas in the mid 1980ʼs and 1990ʼs 
transferred much needed competencies whilst the 
engine manufacturers GE, Pratt and Whitney, Rolls 
Royce all continue to do small scale subcontracting 
work in China.21
　China has a long history with Boeing having 
provided parts since 1979, which now include doors, 
wing panels, vertical fin, horizontal stabilizers and 
entire tail section for the 737, wing-ribs for the 
747－all large aluminium structures.22 Additionally, 
whilst its capabilities in the technological area are 
limited, China makes the composite rudder for the 
new 787. Indeed Boeing is China aerospaceʼs largest 
foreign customer having purchased about a billion 
dollarʼs worth of hardware and further orders to the 
value of $2.5 billion.23
　Airbusʼs association with China is shorter with 
agreements that China would participate in the 
development of its A318 programme, that work on 
doors and fin fairings for a number of models and 
the A320 wing components would be given to 
China（Nolan and Zhang, 2002︶. In 2005 Airbus 
announced its commitment of a 5％ risk-sharing 
partnership stake for the Chinese in the A350 
project and plans to establish a training facility in 
Beijing. In time, the company plans to open a final 
assembly facility in China.24
　
2　Demand led industrial growth
　Perhaps the greatest factor which supports China 
as a potential competitive threat in the long-run is 
the enormous growth of demand for aircraft in its 
domestic market increasing. Airbus, for example, 
forecasts demand for passenger travel in China 
increasing 6.8 per cent per year from 2007-2026.25 
Regional jets account for just 12％ of the total fleet 
whilst the world average is 35％ and Embraer 
believe China could buy 635 jets between 2004-
2023.26 The increased commitment of resources to 
China of the global aircraft players as reported 
above reflects their strategic aims to capture a 
proportion of this market potential.
　
Ⅴ　 Aerospace and Japanʼs Industrial 
Future
　Developments in the aerospace sector cannot be 
understood outside a more general review of Japanʼs 
competitive position conducted by the Japanese 
government in late 1999 and early 2000. It was 
against this background that METI embarked on 
the review of both the long-term technological 
outlook and the assessment of the role of METI in 
industrial innovation in general and R&D assistances 
in particular. The result was compiled in 2001 as 
“Focus 21,” a new policy framework for METIʼs 
R&D initiatives. The emergent consensus among 
policymakers and business leaders was27: 
⑴ 　The Japanese industries have several areas 
of competitive strength. These include Bio 
technologies, Information and Communication 
Technologies, Environmental Technologies, 
and Nano-technologies28; 
⑵ 　While the auto industry may lead the 
manufacturing industry for some time, other 
sectors of the manufacturing industry must 
develop innovative technologies in the 
strategically important areas to make 
themselves competitive; 
⑶ 　The budgetary distribution during the pre-
Koizumi government was dysfunctional, 
resulting in thinly distributed grants to too 
many projects, may need to be replaced by a 
more focused approach. The criteria should be 
twofold. One is whether new initiatives fall 
under the four priority areas of research. 
Another is whether the R&D efforts would 
lead to commercial success in a relatively short 
period.
　In the area of civil aircraft manufacturing, ADID 
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sought to implement Focus 21ʼs priorities by 
championing the development of a Japanese passen-
ger aircraft and an aircraft engine programme. 
ADID develops policies with the close consultation 
with the Aircraft Committee（Kokuki Iinkai）of the 
Industry Structure Council（Sangyo Kozo Shingikai︶. 
The committee was formally launched in September 
2001, succeeding the Aircraft Industry Coun-
cil（Kokuki Kogyo Shingikai︶.29 The Council 
generally embraces ADIDʼs policies. It also provides 
valuable insights into latest industry developments. 
Since its launch, the Committee met at least ten 
times; once a year in 2001 and 2002, and then twice 
a year since 2003. It is a closed meeting and the 
public has limited access to the agenda and the 
minutes. At its eighth meeting, held on February 4, 
2005, the Committee decided to set up a special task 
force called the “Development Project Promotion 
Special Committee（Kaihatsu Jigyo Suishin Senmon 
Iinkai）” with the express purpose of overseeing the 
regional jet project. Its first meeting was held on 
March 17, 2005.30 
　In its operation, ADID operates in a manner 
strikingly consistent with the classic Japanese 
model of coordination among firms and METI. 
ADID has three main tools to achieve its policy 
objectives: Information gathering, analysis and 
sharing; indirect intervention such as “guidance”; 
and direct intervention through subsidies. However, 
Japanʼs budgetary situation has had an impact in 
the manner in which METI supports industrial 
policies across sectors. Broadly, tight budgets 
placed an emphasis on the ability of sectors to ʻsellʼ 
their ideas in competition with other pro-
grammes.31 
　
1　METI, MHI and the MRJ Project
　The new emphasis on aerospace technologies 
and their importance to Japan can be seen in the 
development of the Mitsubishi Regional Jet（MRJ）
project. METI and the Japanese manufactures 
shared a strong and long-lasting desire to develop a 
civil aircraft manufacturing industry. By the early 
2000s, a number of developments changed the 
landscape for the civil aviation industry policy: 
During the 1990ʼs, the regional jet market grew 
rapidly and was soon dominated by two manu-
facturers: Bombardier and Embraer.32 It was 
increasingly seen as promising especially to a new 
entrant given that the market was still growing, the 
most powerful players in the industry, Boeing and 
Airbus, were absent. Like most other states, Japan 
took the view that the entry costs of taking on 
Boeing and Airbus were prohibitive, but the regional 
jet market looked much more promising. At the 
same time, there were potential new entrants, 
namely AVICI of China with its ARJ21 project and 
Sukhoi of Russia with its RRJ100 project. There was 
concern at METI that it would be difficult for a 
Japanese manufacturer to enter the market if Russia 
and China managed to enter the market earlier.33 
Domestic considerations also played their part; a 
new market for smaller jets was anticipated with the 
expansion of Tokyoʼs Haneda domestic airport. For 
the first time, there was a chance for regional jets to 
serve the capital by linking with secondary cities.
　The decision was also assisted by concerns that 
Japanʼs traditional reliance on Boeing for subcontract 
work exposed Japanese firms to risk; they are 
hostage to Boeingʼs product planning processes. In 
response, Japanese firms including MHI began to 
diversify their international linkages.34 By the early 
2000s, Boeingʼs next project was also unclear 
making the Japanese manufacturers including MHI 
to grope many options about their next international 
cooperation projects, including the regional jet 
project. The dramatic slowdown in international jet 
orders after September 11th 2001 also served to 
remind the industry of its over-reliance on its 
American partner for business. Though pleased 
with their status on the Boeing 787 programme, 
Mitsubishi managers were nonetheless concerned 
that there would be no new Boeing programmes 
that would enable the company to develop its 
capabilities in design and composite manufacturing 
processes. The regional jet project was a way to 
develop Mitsubishiʼs capabilities, without offering a 
product to compete with Boeing.35
　Mitsubishi Regional Jet（MRJ）Project of 
Mitsubishi Heavy Industry（MHI）was started in 
May 2003 as the “Environmentally Friendly High 
Performance Small Aircraft Project” of METI 
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︵Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry︶. It is a 
direct R&D grant project administered by METIʼs 
NEDO（New Energy and Industry Technology 
Development Organization）starting in FY 2003 for 8 
years.36 The project is two-phased; the first phase 
would last for five years till the development of a 
test plane, followed by the second phase that would 
cover the initial production of a commercial plane. 
The project was aimed at assisting a private sector 
research and development of a technologically 
advanced（esp. in addressing the issues of the 
environment and the fuel efficiency）next generation 
regional jet capable of carrying 30 to 50 passengers.
　NEDOʼs specification for the new aircraft 
anticipated demand for more cost effective and 
environmentally-friendly products. It also reflected 
an interest in process technologies that would 
enhance speed to market. As such, better fuel 
economy through weight and drag reduction were 
to be achieved by the development of material-
related technologies including composite materials 
and enhanced computational fluid dynamics to 
speed the design process.37
　Though the grant application process at NEDO 
was open, it was understood that only MHI 
︵Mitsubishi Heavy Industry）applied and was 
granted the development money. MHI formed a 
consortium with FHI（Fuji Heavy Industry︶, 
JADC（Japan Aircraft Development Corp）and 
JAXA（Japan Aerospace Exploratory Agency）for the 
project. METI will subsidize up to 50 percent of the 
R&D cost. The total development cost was 
reportedly initially estimated at 50 billion yen38.
　MHI proposed a major revision of the original 
plan in 2005 by shifting the target from a 30-to-50 
seat plane to a 70-to-90 seat plane. The change was 
based on the latest market research conducted by 
JADC and by the strong pressure of the two 
Japanese airlines, JAL（Japan Airlines）and ANA 
︵All Nippon Airways︶, the potential customers.39 
The importance that Mitsubishi assigned to the 
project was evidenced in a significant corporate 
reorganization that occurred in 2007, which 
enhanced the position of the aerospace division in 
the corporate structure. MHI reorganized 
︵upgraded）its corporate structure in October 
2007 by appointing Mr. Kazuyuki Kato as the 
GM（General Manager）and Mr. Masakazu Niwa as 
the deputy GM of the MRJ Project, reporting 
directly to Mr. Nobuo Toda, MD（Managing 
Director）of MHI and GM of its Aerospace 
Headquarters.
　METI officials confirmed that their immediate 
goal of the MRJ project was not directly aimed at 
maximizing Japanʼs national security but to promote 
the aerospace industry as one of key industries.40 
They insisted that having a world class aircraft 
manufacturing industry is by itself an important 
national interest. However, they also pointed out 
that promoting the industry should be a critical and 
integral part of the foundation of Japanʼs national 
security, complete with the expectation that the 
plane would be bought by Japanʼs military and coast 
guard. It also anticipated that the Japanese airlines 
would become the major customers.
　
2　Analysis
　Four characteristics separate the MRJ project 
from the past METI projects. First, ADIA clearly set 
a policy goal to help the Japanese aircraft industry 
achieve a commercial competitiveness in the global 
market; second, ADIA took a risk to allow MHI, not 
the Japanese industry consortium, to pursue the 
project as a fully responsible project owner; third, 
ADIA was determined to break the budgetary status 
quo of METI by positioning the project as a high 
national priority requiring substantial initial 
investment by the government; and finally, ADIA 
was flexible to support MHI to change the project 
focus from a 30-to-50 seat plane to a 70-to-90 seat 
plane.
　ADIA took advantage of the changing policy 
environment by positioning the regional jet project 
as critical in gaining the competitive advantage in 
the environmental technology, which would set 
MHI apart from its rivals, and commercially feasible 
and viable in a relatively short（within 10 years）
period. In this way, ADIA was willing to ride the 
wave within METI in breaking the budgetary status 
quo by positioning the project as one of top R&D 
priorities requiring substantial initial investment by 
the government.
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　ADIAʼs bet on MHI was also unprecedented. Not 
only in the aerospace industry policy, but also in the 
industry policy in practically all the industrial areas, 
METI has been involving major Japanese firms that 
represent their respective industries rather than 
choosing some of them over the others. In certain 
cases, this inclusive approach was successful as 
METI carefully introduced a competitive mechanism 
by forming groups of firms that would compete 
against each other.41 However, in this instance, 
there were only three major firms, and it would be 
difficult for METI to introduce a competitive 
mechanism to them. This point was well 
demonstrated in the past efforts; The consortia for 
YS-11, YX, YXX, and YSX were equally criticized for 
their inefficient management of the projects based 
on the absence of ownership and leadership of key 
players.42 For the first time, ADIA agreed that MHI 
would take the full control and ownership in 
pursuing the project.
　MHI itself, however, had positioned itself over 
time to take advantage of this kind of policy 
environment. The company had developed the 
skills essential for any new foray into aircraft 
manufacturing. Foremost, it had developed 
capabilities in the design and manufacture of load-
bearing composite materials. As noted earlier, this 
capability was developed by the company during its 
work on the F-2 fighter. However, the experience 
with designing and manufacturing large composite 
sections for Boeingʼs 787 finally convinced MHI 
executives that the company could leverage its 
composite capabilities outside of its relationship 
with Boeing.43 Second, the aircraft industry is 
capital-intensive and customer expectations of after-
sales support are crucial elements of the marketing 
of the aircraft. METI officials were clear that 
Mitsubishi was effectively the only diversified 
manufacturer with sufficient resources, including 
capital, and market credibility to make a sustained 
assault on the regional aircraft market.44
　Equally important, ADIA was flexible enough to 
support MHI to change the project focus from a 30-
to-50 seat plane to a 70-to-90 seat plane. Initially, 
METI and MHI agreed to pursue a 30-to-50 seat 
plane project. However, from the beginning, the two 
Japanese airlines, the key potential customers, 
raised their concerns that the proposed plane size 
would be too small for them because of the Japanese 
regulatory constraint.45 It triggered the project 
team to undertake a comprehensive market 
research and the study concluded that the market 
for a 30-to-50 seat plane would be fast saturating, 
while that for a 70-to-90 seat plane would continue 
to grow. Mitsubishiʼs market analysis was suffi-
ciently convincing that METI officials acceded to 
the request to change the project specification.46
　Although ADIA labelled the project as an R&D 
project for environmental technologies which are 
acutely needed for the aircraft industry, it is actually 
pursuing a relatively straightforward industry 
policy to help MHI gain its competitive advantage in 
the global marketplace. At least from the late 1980ʼs 
through to the 1990ʼs, METI did not introduce an 
industry policy openly aimed at helping a Japanese 
industry achieve its globally competitive position.47 
This was partly because of the bilateral trade friction 
between the US and Japan during the period. For 
example, the TRON project, the fifth generation 
computer project and other IT projects were 
severely scrutinized by the US government and 
forced to scale down or internationalize. The formal 
launch of WTO in 1994 and METIʼs policy shift to 
more actively use a market mechanism reduced the 
role of the traditional industrial policy.48
　In the past, METIʼs industry policy was generally 
aimed at helping the target firms develop neces-
sary technologies. This time, the METI officials 
acknowledged that the technological competence 
was one of many critical success factors. They 
viewed that the Japanese manufacturers have 
already accumulated most of the technologies 
necessary for them to develop and manufacture the 
proposed aircraft, and that they are competent in 
developing necessary technologies.49 However, the 
METI officials conceded that the Japanese firms 
may be weak in the project management and the 
system integration capability to manage diverse 
technology suppliers and orchestrate the entire 
process from R&D to manufacturing and assembly, 
an observation made in other studies.50 
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Ⅵ　Conclusion
　Changes in Japanese policies for the aerospace 
industry have emerged from a complex interplay of 
factors, some external to Japan, others internally-
generated. It is clear that industrial rivalry has 
influenced Japanese policymakers. China is 
developing exactly the same sort of relationships 
with Western firms that Japan enjoyed for many 
years. Concern about Japanʼs slippage in 
international manufacturing, combined with 
concerns about the increased technological 
capabilities in many countries, allowed METI to 
catalyse a new, stronger technological orientation 
to industrial support policies. The process analysed 
here suggests elements of continuity with past 
practice. For example, METI continues to be keenly 
interested in manufacturing, perhaps still neglecting 
innovation in services. The bureaucracy is also 
active in developing policy and overseeing its 
implementation. Again, these characteristics are 
well known to observers of the Japanese 
developmental state. However, changes are also 
noteworthy. The close involvement of Mitsubishi in 
the early phases of the project and its dominance of 
the development phase are strikingly unlike earlier 
Japanese efforts in aerospace. METIʼs more 
competitive internal processes seem to have 
resulted in a ʻselecting outʼ of less well-resourced 
and capable firms at an earlier stage. With less 
money to devote to a project, the safer route appears 
to have been chosen.
　That said, MHI was well placed to both facilitate 
and benefit from this policy shift. METIʼs renewed 
interest in aerospace as a technology driver 
coincided with a re-evaluation within the firm about 
its prospects in the sector. The firm has developed 
considerable technical expertise in composite 
construction thanks to its involvement with Boeing 
and with military procurement, as well as its 
acknowledged programme management skills 
acquired across a range of sectors. These capabilities 
emerged over many years, but global concerns 
about fuel efficiency in aircraft have provided the 
firm with a key competitive capability. The MHI 
case also throws some doubt on bald statements 
concerning the inability of large Japanese firms to 
develop new capabilities. Aerospace is entering a 
period of change, as the dominance of Western 
firms erodes as new markets and new technologies 
evolve. 
　Finally, what does this case tell us about change 
in Japanʼs economy? Similar to observations made 
by Storz and Collinson and Wilson, the paper 
outlines a situation where Japan seeks to adapt and 
evolve to economic and technological change.51 
The latter authors suggest that ʻa large proportionʼ 
of Japanese firms still lag in their innovative 
capability.52 Clearly a single case study cannot 
provide a complete answer, but the data here 
suggest more room for optimism. Technological 
developments are not linear, and can evolve in 
unexpected ways. Japan leads the world in the 
development of composite technologies because of 
earlier efforts in textiles, not aerospace; yet 
Mitsubishi has looked to build on compositeʼs 
increasing importance to aerospace. This suggests 
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